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Abstract 
The Scandinavian welfare model is a puzzle to economists: It works economically, even 
though free-riding should prevail with its explosive cocktail of high taxation and high social 
benefits. One possible solution to the puzzle could be the unique stock of social trust present 
in Scandinavia. Here, the four Scandinavian countries (Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and 
Finland) form the top three with scores above 60 percent social trust on a ranking that covers 
94 countries from all over the world. 
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1. Introduction 
Economists have long wondered why people in given situations appear to cooperate more 
than they are expected to (Brandt & Svendsen, 2010). A typical example of a cooperation 
situation can be illustrated as a prisoner‟s dilemma, where two prisoners can choose to 
cooperate or not. The largest payoff is received if both prisoners cooperate, but if one „cheats‟ 
and fails to cooperate, his payoff will be even greater, whereas the other prisoner‟s payoff 
will be significantly smaller. Each prisoner thus has an incentive to cheat and deviate from 
the optimal solution, namely to cooperate (Poulsen & Svendsen, 2005). 
Try to explain classically trained American economists how the Scandinavian welfare model 
works and they will most likely shake their heads, smile, and say: “You must be kidding!” 
But we are not kidding. We can see that the welfare state does in fact work, despite strong 
incentives to moonlight, not pay taxes, and try to receive as many welfare benefits as possible. 
The „bumblebee‟ keeps flying – and it is still in great „socio-economic‟ shape (Svendsen & 
Svendsen, 2016). How is this possible? What is the answer to the Scandinavian puzzle? 
Regarding traditional factors of production, most experts agree that human capital (education 
and vocational training) explains approximately half of a country‟s economic level, whereas 
physical capital explains approximately one fourth. However, the economists cannot explain 
the remaining fourth of a nation‟s wealth, which means that they must have overlooked 
something (Svendsen, 2014). This flaw in economic theory may be due to a missing link: 
social capital, here measured in the form of social trust. 
This approach is justified by everyday observations and experiments that show that people 
continue to cooperate – even if the optimal choice for the individual person is not to 
cooperate, i.e. free-ride at the expense of others, who thus have to work even harder (Brandt 
& Svendsen, 2010). Think of George Orwell‟s Animal Farm, a parody of the communist 
society. Here the new „idealistic‟ leaders on a farm taken over by animals (the pigs) free-ride 
at the expense of the workers (the other animals). The naïve and conscientious horse Boxer 
constantly tries to solve the problem „by working harder‟, until he works himself to death. 
When the free-rider problem is overcome in most cases, it may be because a third party 
enforces formal rules which create the optimal (cooperative) equilibrium; a t least this has 
traditionally been the economists‟ recommended solution to coordination problems. But in 
many situations this does not explain cooperative behavior. In some cases formal rules do not 
exist or are not enforced, and in others cooperative equilibrium may be illegal according to 
the given society‟s rules (Svendsen & Svendsen, 2006). 
Another possible explanation for the phenomenon of absent free-riding and surplus 
cooperation could be that something is missing from specifications of the profit functions that 
indicate the players‟ payoff for each result. We fail to factor in that the active players „know 
each other‟, or, in economic terms, that each player has expectations to the other players, i.e. 
the likelihood that the other agent chooses to cooperate. So, in addition to society‟s official 
and formal rules, we have a set of social norms that affect the economic agents‟ preferences 
and, thus, their optimal choices. This is also true if we focus exclusively on a „one shot‟ game 
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and not on repeated games, where the players can discipline each other‟s behavior (Poulsen 
& Svendsen, 2005). Thus, this „something‟ we are looking for may be explained by the 
presence of the umbrella concept „social capital‟, which has built bridges between the social 
sciences and strengthened cross-disciplinary cooperation in a large number of areas (Ostrom 
& Ahn, 2009). 
For example, a used car salesman who double-crosses a customer grossly will be cursed up 
and down by the customer and it will affect his reputation, resulting in fewer customers for 
his cars, as the customers will lose faith in the salesman. However, trust is necessary for the 
used car salesman, as it is difficult for ordinary people to determine whether a car is a wreck 
or not. Trust, as in the customers‟ expectation of not being double-crossed, precisely 
compensates for asymmetrical information; the used car salesman knows a lot more about 
cars than most of his customers. In cases where this social mechanism of discipline works, 
the problem of free-riding will diminish. The extra costs involved in double-crossing will 
make it more attractive for the salesman to cooperate and get satisfied and happy customers, 
who will return and recommend his shop to other possible car buyers. In a car repair shop 
customers can sometimes borrow a car while their own car is being fixed. There are countless 
examples like these of the ways in which Scandinavians (who do not know each other) trust 
each other – not „blindly‟, but because it is highly likely that they can in fact trust each other 
and thus save themselves a lot of time-consuming hassle and costs. Scandinavians do not 
need to constantly protect themselves against cheating (Svendsen & Svendsen, 2006). 
In the same way the Danish welfare state arguably builds on trust a nd the absence of 
large-scale cheating in the system. Existing (high) taxes and the extent of welfare services are 
based on confidence that others work and pay their taxes too – rather than moonlight or sleep 
on the couch all day (Jensen & Svendsen, 2011). If not, individual taxpayers would soon 
protest and stop paying their taxes; in such cases the public finances would suffer, as has 
been the case in countries like Greece. 
When trust prevails, more transactions can take place at lower costs, and predictab ility and 
production in society will increase, because formal measurement and enforcement of all 
transactions is no longer necessary. This implies that if the members of a society generally 
trust each other, they may obtain higher collective economic growth than in similar societies 
without mutual trust (Serritzlew et al., 2013; Bjørnskov, 2009). Similarly, trust in institutions 
means that political decision-makers can implement regulations more easily, because the 
citizens have no fear of being double-crossed. They know that their tax money is being 
invested properly, and that they will gain a satisfactory profit in the form of common goods – 
they get their money‟s worth. Furthermore, the need to control the behavior of the citizens is 
greater in low-trust societies than in high-trust societies. 
Based on the work of the American sociologist Coleman (1988, p. 95), social capital can 
simply be defined as the ability to cooperate without written rules and extensive contracts. If 
the appropriate norms for cooperation exist, people can come together to enable more 
transactions without third-party enforcement. In the following we will focus on positive 
social capital, where group formation promotes economic growth as a new factor of 
Issues in Social Science 
ISSN 2329-521X 
2015, Vol. 3, No. 2 
www.macrothink.org/iss 93 
production. In other words, we exclude cases where negative or dark social capital, for 
example mafias and other criminal organizations, obstructs the economic growth of a country 
(Graeff, 2009; Graeff & Svendsen, 2013).  
2. Social Trust 
Social capital and the ability to cooperate are hardly measurable. Therefore, the concept is 
first and foremost operationalized as social trust (Paldam & Svendsen, 2000). Offe (1999) 
defines trust as trust in persons that springs from earlier experiences with specific persons. In 
continuation of this definition we propose that social trust is defined as the expectation that a 
stranger will adhere to a given norm. In other words, trust harbors the expectation that 
another person or a bureaucrat in a formal institution will not breach the norm and cheat 
whenever a private net advantage could be gained by doing so. A norm (from the Latin 
norma, meaning a carpenter‟s rule) defines which action is right and which is wrong. 
Likewise, the welfare state prescribes that it is good to work and contribute to the common 
pool which finances welfare benefits. 
Social trust differs fundamentally from trust, as it is expanded to include people of whom the 
trusting party has no direct information, such as other citizens and taxpayers in the welfare 
state. Social trust in non-specific people (strangers) is typically measured as the extent to 
which a person thinks he can trust most people. Trust in most (but not all) people under most 
(but not all) circumstances simply means that a person trusts most strangers.  
Thus, social trust also tells us something about the probability of being double-crossed by 
people we do not know personally. Therefore, social trust may also convey something about 
the ability to cooperate. The smaller the risk of being double-crossed, the easier it is to 
cooperate with a stranger or an institution of which you do not have full information 
(Svendsen & Svendsen, 2016). 
In Scandinavia there are firmly established social norms against cheating one another. Here 
people tend to keep their word. This type of basic trust in others „lubricates‟ the system. We 
see it in our daily lives in many ways, discrete and unnoticed, as small things that make 
everyday life easier. Of course, this is not new. Already in 1766, the economist Adam Smith 
saw that the degree of trust in other people varies among countries. He concluded that the 
Dutch were best at keeping their word, and that the risk of being cheated here was very small 
(Smith, 1997).  
Besides social welfare, such resource savings also create an economic competitive advantage 
in relation to countries with widespread cheating and where people constantly have to guard 
themselves against swindlers. John Stuart Mill (1848) argued that there are countries in 
Europe where it is difficult to do business due to cheating and lack of trust. It is no doubt 
more fun to live in a society where people keep their word than in a society where you are 
cheated or assaulted every time you turn your back on people. If a behavioral norm of 
behaving properly can be maintained, it is good for the overall economy; simply because it 
takes fewer resources to do business with each other.  
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For example, it is easier to sell a horse in a high- trust society; the parties shake hands on the 
deal, and the buyer can send the money a week later. In a low-trust society there is a big risk 
that the buyer takes the horse with him and forgets to send the money. To safeguard himself 
from this type of cheating, the seller needs to prepare a written contract, which the buyer has 
to sign. This takes time. If the buyer still fails to pay, the seller is forced to hire lawyers and 
sue the „buyer‟ or simply get help from some thugs to get the horse back or bring home the 
money. Time is thus spent on expensive disputes of this kind – time that could have been 
spent on making society happier and richer (Svendsen & Svendsen, 2006). 
As mentioned, social capital in the form of cooperativeness and social cohesion in a 
population is normally operationalized as social trust. We know how Scandinavian countries 
are placed in relation to other countries in terms of trust, because we have measures from 
both the World Values Survey and the Danish Social Capital Project (SoCap) (Svendsen & 
Svendsen 2010). Here social trust is measured as the percentage of the population that 
answers „yes‟ when asked whether they feel that they can trust most other people in the 
population. This question is taken from the World Values Survey (Inglehart et al., 2004) and 
was originally developed by Morris Rosenberg (1956). Figure 1 shows the social trust scores 
for 94 countries ranked according to average over time, i.e. from the first wave (early 80‟s) to 
the last wave (2008-9). 
Focusing on the average scores for each country, the four Scandinavian welfare states 
(Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland) are clustered at the top with more social trust than 
the other countries. The average for Scandinavia as a whole is 63.4 percent, i.e. well above 60 
percent. Danes are the most trusting people at the moment (76.0 percent in 2008-9). The 
Netherlands comes in fifth with an average 55.9 percent score; thus, Adam Smith‟s remark 
from 1766 that the Dutch keep their word is still true.  
Following the lead group we find other Western countries like New Zealand (49.1 percent), 
Switzerland (47.7 percent), Canada (46.9 percent), and Australia (45.3 percent). The USA has 
a 41.6 percent average score over time and scored 39.6 percent last time (2005-7); the 
country has thus experienced a significant drop of approximately 10 percentage points since 
the early 1990s.  
Germany holds a 36.2 percent average score – the first three measurements cover West 
Germany alone, whereas the rest cover both West Germany and the former East Germany 
(Svendsen & Svendsen, 2010). Note that West Germany scores approximately 42 percent in 
the mid-1990s, whereas the former East Germany (number 39 on the list) scores 25 percent. 
This difference might be a result of the different institutional designs in the two areas – a 
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Table 1. General trust in 94 countries. Percentage of respondents who state that „most people 
can be trusted‟ („don‟t know answers‟ are excluded). Ranked according to the average score 
  World Values Surveys    
  Early 80s Early 90s Mid-90s 2000 2005-7 2008-9 
Average 
score 
1. Norway 61.2 65.1 65.3   75.1 66.7 
2. Sweden 57.1 66.1 59.7 66.3 68.0 70.7 64.7 
3. Denmark 56.0 57.7  66.5  76.0 64.0 
4. Finland 57.2 62.8 47.6 58.0 58.8 64.7 58.2 
5. Netherlands 46.2 55.8  59.8  61.7 55.9 
6. China     52.3  52.3 
7. New Zealand   49.1    49.1 
8. Switzerland  43.2 41.0  51.1 55.4 47.7 
9. Indonesia    51.6 42.5  47.1 
10. Canada 49.6 52.4  38.8   46.9 
11. Vietnam    41.4 52.1  46.8 
12. Australia 47.8  39.9  48.2  45.3 
13. Iceland 39.8 41.6 43.6 41.1  51.4 43.5 
14. Japan 40.8 41.7 46.0 43.1 39.1  42.1 
15. USA 46.8 50.0 35.6 35.8 39.6  41.6 
16. Thailand     41.5  41.5 
17. Ireland 41.1 47.4  35.2  38.9 40.7 
18. Northern 
Ireland 
47.4 44.8  39.5  30.8 40.6 
19. Great Britain 44.4 43.6 29.7 29.7  40.3 37.5 
20. Germany 29.8 37.9 41.8 34.8 34.1 38.8 36.2 
21. India  34.6 39.2 41.0 23.3  34.5 
22. Austria  31.8  33.9  36.8 34.2 
23. Belarus  25.5 24.1 41.8  44.8 34.1 
24. Azerbaijan   20.5   44.9 32.7 
25. Belgium 30.2 33.2  30.7  34.6 32.2 
26. South Korea 38.0 34.2 30.3 27.3 30.2  32.0 
27. Spain 34.5 33.8 29.8 36.2 19.9 34.3 31.4 
28. Taiwan   38.2  24.2  31.2 
29. Italy 26.3 35.3  32.6 29.2 30.8 30.8 
30. Montenegro   32.3 33.7  24.9 30.3 
31. Russia 35.2 37.5 23.9 23.7  29.9 30.0 
32. Jordan    27.7 31.3  29.5 
33. Ukraine   31.0 27.2 28.3 28.9 28.9 
34. Luxembourg    26.0  31.1 28.6 
35. Czech Republic  30.2 28.5 23.9  30.1 28.2 
36. Egypt    37.9 18.4  28.2 
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  World Values Surveys    
  Early 80s Early 90s Mid-90s 2000 2005-7 2008-9 
Average 
score 
37. Lithuania  30.8 21.9 24.9  29.9 26.9 
38. Dominican 
Repub. 
 26.5     26.5 
39. East Germany  25.6 24.9  28.3  26.3 
40. Estonia  27.5 21.5 22.8  32.6 26.1 
41. Pakistan   20.6 30.8   25.7 
42. Albania   27.0 24.4   25.7 
43. Bulgaria  30.4 28.6 26.9 22.0 17.9 25.2 
44. Hungary 33.2 24.6 22.7 21.8  21.2 24.7 
45. Ethiopia     24.4  24.4 
46. France 24.8 22.8  22.2  27.2 24.3 
47. Poland  34.4 17.9 18.9 19.5 27.6 23.7 
48. Bosnia-Herzego
v. 
  28.3 15.8  26.6 23.6 
49. Israel    23.5   23.5 
50. Mexico 17.6 33.5 28.1 21.3 15.6  23.2 
51. Nigeria  23.0 19.5 25.6   22.7 
52. Armenia   24.7   20.5 22.6 
53. Greece    23.7  21.3 22.5 
54. Bangladesh   20.9 23.5   22.2 
55. Uruguay   22.1    22.1 
56. Latvia  19.1 24.8 17.1  25.5 21.6 
57. South Africa 30.6 28.4 18.2 11.8 17.5  21.3 
58. Malta    20.7  21.7 21.2 
59. Andorra     20.7  20.7 
60. Croatia   23.6 18.4  19.7 20.6 
61. Georgia   18.7   22.1 20.4 
62. Argentina 27.0 23.3 17.5 15.4 16.9  20.0 
63. Chile  22.7 21.9 22.8 12.4  20.0 
64. Slovak 
Republic 
 23.0 27.0 15.7  12.6 19.6 
65. Slovenia  17.4 15.5 21.7 18.1 24.2 19.4 
66. Serbia   29.8 18.8 15.3 11.8 18.9 
67. Morocco    23.5 13.0  18.3 
68. Mali     17.5  17.5 
69. Singapore    16.9   16.9 
70. Moldova   22.2 14.7 17.9 12.5 16.8 
71. Romania  16.1 18.7 10.1 20.3 17.6 16.6 
72. Portugal  21.4  10.0  17.2 16.2 
73. Ghana   22.4  8.5  15.5 
74. Venezuela   13.7 15.9   14.8 
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  World Values Surveys    
  Early 80s Early 90s Mid-90s 2000 2005-7 2008-9 
Average 
score 
75. Burkina Faso     14.7  14.7 
76. El Salvador   14.6    14.6 
77. Puerto Rico   6.0 22.6   14.3 
78. Macedonia   8.2 13.5  20.1 13.9 
79. Zimbabwe    11.9   11.9 
80. Zambia     11.5  11.5 
81. Algeria    11.2   11.2 
82. Kosovo      11.2 11.2 
83. Cyprus     12.8 9.2 11.0 
84. Colombia   10.8    10.8 
85. Albania      10.6 10.6 
86. Turkey  10.0 5.5 15.7 4.8 11.0 9.4 
87. Malaysia     8.8  8.8 
88. Tanzania    8.1   8.1 
89. Uganda    7.6   7.6 
90. Peru   5.0 10.7 6.4  7.4 
91. Philippines   5.5 8.4   7.0 
92. Brazil  6.7 2.8  9.2  6.2 
93. Rwanda     4.9  4.9 
94. Trinidad/Tobag
o 
    3.8  3.8 
         
 
Together with Germany it is remarkable how other European countries such as Great Britain 
(37.5 percent), Austria (34.2 percent), Spain (31.4 percent), Italy (30.8 percent), France (24.3 
percent), Romania (16.6 percent), Portugal (16.6 percent), Cyprus (11.0 percent), and Turkey 
(9.4 percent) have relatively low scores compared to the Scandinavian countries. Other 
examples include India, which holds a 34.5 percent score, and Russia with 30.0 percent.  
The three countries ranked at the bottom are Brazil (6.2 percent), Rwanda (4.9 percent), and 
finally Trinidad/Tobago (3.8 percent). 
Overall, the four Scandinavian countries hold unique stocks of social trust. The above 60 
percent average over time of the top four Scandinavian countries is remarkable compared to 
the rest of the world. This huge variation across countries highlights that Scandinavia has 
„something‟ special. Consequently, the observed scores for social trust thus offer the first 
explanation of how the Scandinavian bumblebees stay in the air.  
3. Conclusion 
We have argued that the missing „something‟ for explaining the puzzle of the 
well- functioning Scandinavian welfare state could be the countries‟ unique level of social 
Issues in Social Science 
ISSN 2329-521X 
2015, Vol. 3, No. 2 
www.macrothink.org/iss 98 
trust. The overall result is clear: Scandinavians are the world‟s most trusting people. The top 
three (Denmark, Norway, and Sweden) held more than 70 percent social trust in 2008-9, 
which means that near three out of four citizens trust most other people in these countries. 
Social trust may therefore be the „Scandinavian gold‟ that makes the bumblebee fly. It is 
easier for people who trust each other to work together, as the risk of being cheated is smaller. 
Therefore, social trust is a useful measure to describe the ability to cooperate across countries. 
It would be relevant to introduce more cases from both private and public companies in 
future research based on different types of control and trust monitoring. Increased use of 
delegation and trust-based management in everyday life will probably be visible at the 
bottom line (because trust requires less resources than control) in the form of increased 
employee satisfaction, more volunteerism and less absenteeism due to illness (which will also 
be visible at the bottom line). 
In perspective, the comparative advantage of social trust for the Scandinavian welfare state 
has to be highlighted even further in future research. So, in order to preserve and expand the 
existing stock of social trust it is crucial to explore and understand how it is accumulated. 
This insight into the „Scandinavian gold‟ may be nurtured and exported, for example as 
trust-based management principles to the USA. It may, however, also disappear again if not 
properly maintained. If the Scandinavian high-trust societies should in the future turn into 
control societies, they will probably no longer be among the world‟s leading countries in 
terms of socio-economic success. 
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